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THE STRONG GETTING STRONGER:
RECORD LABELS BENEFIT FROM PROPOSED
CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 1998, recording artist Toni Braxton' filed for Chapter
7 Bankruptcy and rattled the recording industry.2 In the five years prior to
her bankruptcy petition, her albums sold an estimated fifteen million copies
worldwide. Based on her album sales, it was not apparent that she needed
bankruptcy protection.
However, the recording industry's interest in Braxton's bankruptcy
did not focus on her financial difficulties. Under current bankruptcy law,
recording artists such as Braxton are able to terminate their recording
contracts after filing for bankruptcy in good faith.4 As a result, suspicious
industry insiders have suggested that Braxton intended to escape what she
believed to be an inequitable contract with LaFace and Arista Records.'
Braxton's supporters, however, cite her claimed 2.8 million dollars of debt
as proof that her filing was legitimate and in good faith.6
Bankruptcy law has historically provided a "safe harbor" for the
indigent and financially destitute.7 For some, however, bankruptcy has
evolved into an integral part of doing business.' For example, bankruptcy
is commonly used as a means for quickly settling controversies, a method
1. Toni Braxton, a five time Grammy winner, is a renowned pop music singer whose hits
include "Breathe Again" and "Unbreak My Heart." Degen Pener, A Star is Broke, ENT. WKLY.,
Feb. 20-27, 1998, at 72, 74.
2. See Chris Morris, Biz Mulls Fallout From Braxton's Bankruptcy Filing, BILLBOARD,
Feb. 28, 1998, at 5, 80.
3. Id.
4. See Leslie A. Cohen & David L. Neale, Bankruptcy and Contractual Relations in the
Entertainment Industy-An Overview, in 1990 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS
HANDBOOK 387 (John David Viera et al. eds., Clark Boardman Co. 1990).
5. See Morris, supra note 2, at 80.
6. See Pener, supra note 1.
7. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 375.
8. See Green v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., No. 90-1520-CIV-T-17A, 1993 WL 83301 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 11, 1993); In re Texaco, 109 B.R. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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of acquiring leverage in negotiations, and even as an alternative to
litigation. 9
Similar to other businesses, the recording industry has felt the impact
of increased bankruptcy filings.' 0 Recording artists have increasingly used
bankruptcy to escape their obligations under their recording contracts."
These recording artists allege that in initial negotiations, they often lack the
leverage necessary to alter the recording contract provisions demanded by
record labels.12 Moreover, due to these unfavorable contract terms, artists
argue they are unable to sufficiently reap the benefits of increased
popularity. 3 Therefore, recording artists believe bankruptcy is a just and
proper means to relieve the financial difficulties resulting from these
unfavorable agreements.
14
After the increase in artist bankruptcies, recording labels realized that
artists had an effective means to escape their recording contracts." Record
labels contend that it is unfair for recording artists to terminate their
contractual obligations by merely filing for bankruptcy.' 6  Consequently,
the concerns of the record labels set in motion a congressional lobbying
effort to prevent recording artists from rejecting their contracts through
bankruptcy. 
17
The proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act'8 drafted by the
104th Congress contained a specifically targeted provision effectively
eliminating recording artists' ability to relieve themselves of recording
9. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 375.
10. See Morris, supra note 2, at 80.
11. See Wallace Collins, Artist Bankruptcies Disrupt Record Biz, 218 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8,
1997, at 5.
12. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS
109, 111 (1994) (noting that new artists typically receive lower royalty rates and advances than
other artists).
13. See Pener, supra note 1, at 74-75. Braxton's management claims that her initial
recording contract yielded a mere three percent of her $170 million gross record sales after all of
the record company's expenses were recouped. id
14. See Collins, supra note 11, at 5. While bankruptcy may sound like a relatively simple
solution to an unfair contract, it is important to understand that filing for bankruptcy can have
repercussions. See Morris, supra note 2, at 80. As one music industry attorney noted: "It's the
last thing I, as a lawyer would recommend someone to do .... You go into bankruptcy court, it's
goodbye to you having any say about what to do with your money and your life." Id. (quoting
Los Angeles attorney Neville Johnson).
15. See Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") press release (Oct. 6, 1998)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
16. See id.
17. See id
18. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 105-794 § 102 (1998).
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contracts through filing bankruptcy.1 9 While the proposed version of the
bill did not pass,20 a modified version containing the same provision will
likely be reintroduced next term.2'
This Comment examines and criticizes the proposed change to the
treatment of recording contracts in bankruptcy. Part II briefly explains the
Bankruptcy Code and how it affects contractual relations such as record
contracts. Part III explains how the music industry functions and
compensates artists. Part IV reconciles a split in current bankruptcy case
law. This Part also explains why bankruptcy courts allow recording artists
to reject their record contracts, while other entertainers may remain bound
to their obligations. Part V discusses the history of the proposed change to
the Bankruptcy Code, the arguments that have followed it through the
legislative process, and how the new relevant provisions would operate.
Part V also argues that the proposed legislation is too severe for recording
artists. Part VI concludes that the proposed changes to the Bankruptcy
Code unjustifiably elevate record companies' rights above the rights of
recording artists. This Part also contains suggestions that would better
balance the interests of artists against the interests of record companies.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power
to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.22  The Bankruptcy Code23 ("the
Code") is the statutory system Congress implemented to provide a single
forum of law for debtors 24 to utilize in order to liquidate or discharge their
19. See Barry Bergman, Editorial, Bankruptcy-Reform Protest, BILLBOARD, June 13, 1998,
at3.
20. See Melissa Kozlowski, Talks Miss Deadline (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
<http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/bankruptreform.html>; see also Electronic Mail from American
Bankruptcy Institute (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Journal).
21. See Melissa Kozlowski, Senate OKs Changes to Bankruptcy Criteria (visited Sept. 25,
1998) <http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/bankruptreform.html>; see also Electronic Mail from
American Bankruptcy Institute (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Dina Ellis, who drafted the Bankruptcy
Reform Act for Congressman Gekas (Nov. 13, 1998) (indicating Congressman Gekas's intent to
reintroduce the Bankruptcy Reform Act); Telephone Interview with Carry Sherman, General
Counsel of the RIAA (Nov. 20, 1998) (indicating the RIAA's intent to reintroduce the
compromised language).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
23. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1998).
24. A debtor is the person or entity filing for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C § 109.
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liabilities.25 The Code balances debtors' interests in discharging liabilities
against creditors' interests in attempting to satisfy their claims.26
The original purpose behind bankruptcy is to allow a debtor to obtain
a "fresh start" by ending creditor harassment and the worries and pressures
of too much debt.27 As the Supreme Court noted, "[tihe most important
consideration ... of the Bankruptcy [Code is] to give the debtor a 'new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' ' 28 In order to help the
debtor obtain this fresh start, Congress has allowed almost all of the
debtors' liabilities to be discharged, no matter how remote or contingent
the obligation might be. 9
However, federal and state statutes contain some limitations as to
what liabilities the debtor may discharge.30 The debtor will remain liable
for the full amount of these non-dischargeable liabilities outside bankruptcy
proceedings, regardless of the debtor's petition.3' Some examples of these
debts include income tax liability, fraud claims, alimony, educational loans,
and claims for willful and malicious injuries.32
Three forms of bankruptcy are available to individual debtors,
including recording artists: Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 .
Under all three methods, debtors can discharge, or effectively terminate,
any debt that gives rise to a right of payment, such as past due bills.34 The
three methods also allow the discharge of equitable remedies for breach if
25. See Stuart J. Wald, Bankruptcy and Personal Services Contracts: What Works, What
Doesn't, and Why, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 1998, at 3.
26. See id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977).
28. Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 244-45 (1934)).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 180, 309; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 727.13, at 727-
58 to 727-59 (Lawrence P. King ed., 1998); see generally Rowan v. Morgan, 747 F.2d 1052 (6th
Cir. 1984) (holding that an obligation to repay social security benefits that were overpaid may be
discharged).
30. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1998); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03
[2][d][v], at 1-29 to 1-30.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)-(18); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03
[2][d][vl, at 1-29 to 1-30; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 523.07-523.24, at 523-
22 to 523-109.
33. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 701, 1101. There are also two other forms of bankruptcy not
relevant to most recording artists. Chapter 9 is the section of the bankruptcy code which
municipalities must file under. See I1 U.S.C. § 109(c). Chapter 12 deals with bankruptcy of
individual family farmers. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(0; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29,
1.03 [5], at 1-47 to 1-49.
34. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining claims dischargable in bankruptcy).
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the remedy also gives rise to a right of payment, like injunctions arising
from breaches of contracts.35
Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.3 6 After a
debtor files for Chapter 7, a court appoints a trustee who immediately takes
control of all the debtor's assets37 that are not exempted. 38 The trustee then
liquidates39 these assets and distributes them in accordance with the
statutory priorities. 40  Chapter 7 is available to both individuals and
businesses.4 '
Chapter 11 is the reorganization chapter of the Code.42  While
available to some individuals, it is primarily used by partnerships and
corporations. 43  Chapter 11 allows the debtor to retain possession of its
business and continue to operate while an agreement is reached with the
creditors." For this reorganization plan to be completed, a requisite
majority of creditors must agree to the debt restructuring. 45 However, the
overseeing court may approve a reorganization if it finds the plan to be fair
and equitable.46
35. Id. But see 11 U.S.C. § 522 (providing exemptions for those exceptions made under
applicable state or federal law). Dischargeable equitable remedies include negative injunctions
enforcing covenants not to compete. See In re Brown, 211 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997);
Wald, supra note 25, at 3.
36. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03 [2][a], at 1-21.
37. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03 [2][c][ii], at 1-26.
38. See infra Part 11.A.
39. Id.
40. The Code establishes a complex hierarchy which controls the order in which creditors
receive proceeds. See 11 U.S.C § 507. The Code allocates liabilities into specific categories
based on who is owed or how the liability arose. Id. Then, each category is arranged by
priorities. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726. Finally, creditors attempt to satisfy their claims against the
estate's assets in order of priority group. See 11 U.S.C. § 726. However, if the estate is
exhausted before the next priority class, their claims may remain unpaid. See id. For a more
thorough discussion, see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29,1 1.03 [2][d][xi], at 1-35 to
1-36-1.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b). However, Chapter 7 relief is not available to banks, insurance
companies or railroads. Id Chapter 7 is also the only chapter that stockbrokers and commodity
brokers may file under. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03 [2][a], at 1-22.
42. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1 1.03 [41, at 1-37.
43. See id.
44. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108, 1121; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1.03
[4][b]-[c], at 1-40 to 1-41.
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 11.03 [4][c], at
1-43.
46. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b); I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 11.03 [4][c], at
1-44 to 1-45.
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Chapter 13 is the analogous chapter for individual debt
reorganization. 47  Chapter 13 is restricted to individuals or sole
proprietorships with regular income whose unsecured debts do not exceed
$250,000 and whose secured debts do not exceed $750,000.48 Chapter 13
allows debtors to keep their assets49 if the court approves a reorganization
plan that repays the creditors over the course of three to five years. ° Once
the debtor has made all the payments, the debtor will receive a discharge.5
A. The Estate
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "estate" under Section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code,52 which is a legal entity separate and apart
from the debtor.53 Virtually all the property owned by the debtor at the
time the petition is filed becomes property of the estate, 54 subject to several
exemptions." The property of the estate is then administered to creditors
in a bankruptcy proceeding.1
6
B. Executory Contracts
Perhaps one of the most powerful tools of bankruptcy is the debtor's
ability to escape performance of some pre-petition contracts.57 These types
of contracts are deemed "executory" and may be rejectable after the debtor
enters bankruptcy proceedings 8
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY, supra note 29, 11.03 [6], at 1-49.
48. See II U.S.C. § 109(e).
49. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, supra note 29, 1.03 [6], at 1-50.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
51. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY, supra note 29, 11.03 [6], at 1-51.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
53. See id The Supreme Court has reasoned that the policy of the Bankruptcy Code allows
for the bankruptcy estate to contain anything connected to the debtor's pre-bankruptcy past and
not needed to make a fresh start. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
54. Id.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 522. For example, the individual debtor is allowed to keep earnings for
services performed after declaring bankruptcy, which permits salaried employees to retain the
money they earn after filing bankruptcy so that they can continue supporting themselves. See 11
U.S.C. § 541(aX6). But see 11 U.S.C. § 1306(aX2) (providing that under Chapter 13
bankruptcies, earnings from service contracts performed up to the closure of the case can become
part of the estate). Debtors are also allowed to keep other necessities such as interest in their
home (provided the interest is worth less than $16,150), a car worth less than $2,575, household
furnishings worth less than an aggregate of $8,625, and governmental benefits such as social
security payments and veterans benefits. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(dXl)-(10).
56. See Wald, supra note 25.
57. See Wald, supra note 25, at 4.
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 800 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)
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An executory contract is "a contract under which the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed
that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other."' 9 There are three
possible types of executory contracts: (1) contracts that the debtor has
performed and the non-debtor has not;6° (2) contracts that the non-debtor
has performed and the debtor has not;61 and (3) contracts that neither party
has substantially performed.62 This broad definition allows the bankruptcy
estate to include many of a debtor's existing contracts.
Once it is established that a contract is executory, it may be rejected,
or effectively terminated, if it withstands the "business judgment" rule.
63
In the bankruptcy context, the rule may prohibit the debtor from rejecting
the contract if "the party whose contract is to be rejected would be
damaged disproportionately to any benefit to be derived by the general
creditors of the estate." 64  This formulation allows courts to equitably
balance the interests of the debtor against the creditors' claims.
65
The business judgment rule also allows courts to consider the debtor's
viewpoint. 66 Courts have authorized rejection when the contract at issue
would be particularly burdensome to the debtor.67 Conversely, courts may
not allow rejection when the contract is beneficial to the debtor.68 For
example, when a debtor is solvent 69 and a contract is not particularly
burdensome, courts commonly refuse to reject an executory contract.7'
Because the debtor would suffer relatively little harm as compared to the
non-debtor party in the contract, the business judgment rule would prohibit
the debtor from rejecting the contract.7'
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 365).
59. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973).
60. Id. at 458.
61. Id. at451.
62. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1 365.02[1], at 365-17.
63. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 383.
64. See Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. at 801.
65. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 384.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th
Cir. 1985); Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 384.
69. A debtor is solvent when he has the ability to pay debts as they come due. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (6th ed. 1990).
70. See Chi-FengHuang, 23 B.R. at 803; In re Meehan, 46 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985).
71. See Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. at 803.
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Courts have held that a variety of contracts are rejectable, such as
partnership72 and partnership dissolution agreements, 73 contracts to sell real
property, 74 and licensing agreements.75  However, there is a split in
authority as to whether personal service contracts, such as recording
contracts, are rejectable. 76
Time is integral to determining whether a contract is eligible for
rejection. 77 Executory contracts are included in the estate as long as they
were formed prior to the bankruptcy filing.78 However, if the contracts
were formed after the bankruptcy filing, the court does not consider them
for rejection. 79  Also, contracts that have expired by the terms of the
contract may be exempted from the estate and bankruptcy. 0
If the contract is rejected, it is equivalent to a breach by the debtor on
the day before the petition for bankruptcy was filed8' and both parties are
subsequently excused from performance.82 The estate is then liable for
damages to the non-debtor party.83
It is also important to note that the rejection process for Chapter 7
differs from Chapters 11 and 13. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all executory
contracts are automatically deemed rejected sixty days after filing for
bankruptcy' 4 unless the debtor moves to reject or keep the contract before
that date.85 On the other hand, under Chapters 11 and 13, the debtor must
move for rejection of a contract; 6 the contracts are not rejected as a matter
of law.87 The Chapter 1 1 or 13 debtor must also request rejection before
the court confirms its reorganization plan.88
72. See In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984).
73. In re Silver, 26 B.R. 526, 527-28 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
74. See In re Aslan, 15 B.C.D. 136, 139 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
75. See Lubrizol Enters., 756 F.2d at 1047 (involving nonexclusive license agreements);
Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver, 625 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving exclusive license
agreements).
76. See infra Part IV.
77. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 380.
78. Id. at 380-83.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., In re Waterkist, 775 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1985).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1998).
82. See id; In re IML Freight, Inc., 37 B.R. 556, 559 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (noting that
parties are excused from performance only under certain circumstances); Wald, supra note 25, at
4.
83. Wald, supra note 25, at 4.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365(dXl). The statute also allows for the debtor to request an extension
upon proof of "cause." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 303(h).
87. Id.
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The preceding material provides an essential background to the
Bankruptcy Code so that the reader can understand how recording artists
proceed in rejecting recording contracts. Moreover, the provision affecting
recording artists is part of a complete overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, it is helpful to know how bankruptcy and rejection works under
current law in order to understand the impact this overhaul may have on
recording artists.
III. RECORDING ARTISTS' FINANCES OFTEN PRESENT BANKRUPTCY
PROBLEMS
Without knowledge of how recording artists are paid for their labor,
the notion of a bankrupt "star" might seem absurd. 9 Contrary to popular
belief, most recording artists are not tremendously wealthy,90 nor do they
necessarily possess business savvy.9' Many recording artists are primarily
concerned with developing and creating music, and are not inclined to
properly manage their finances. 92 Thus, it is not uncommon for artists to
suffer the effects of poor financial judgment. Famous artists who are or
have been in dire financial straits include Toni Braxton, 93 TLC,94 Issac
Hayes,95 the lead singer of Kool & the Gang,96 Willie Nile,97 MC Hammer
(now known as Hammer),98 Meat Loaf,99 actress Tia Carrere,' 0 and Chaka
Kahn. 101
88. Id.
89. See Tonya Pendleton, The Price of Fame Can Be Bankruptcy, THE RECORD, (Northern
New Jersey), Apr. 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5802158.
90. See id.
91. See David Nathan, The Business ofManaging Money, BILLBOARD, June 6, 1998, at 40.
92. See Pendleton, supra note 89, (quoting Garry Harris, former senior director of A&R
Records).
93. See Pener, supra note 1, at 72.
94. See In re Watkins, 210 B.R. 394, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); Nathan, supra note 91, at
40.
95. See Chris Probert, Heineken Soul and Blues Festival, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
July 20, 1998, at C3.
96. See Delightful Music, Ltd. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1990).
97. See In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 794 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Willie Nile was a
singer/songwriter who had signed a recording contract with Arista Records. Id. at 795.
98. Pendleton, supra note 89.
99. See Justin Pritchard, Striking a Chord with Congress, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at D8.
100. See In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
101. See Pritchard, supra note 99, at D8.
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A. The Structure of an Artist's Earnings and Payment
To further understand why recording artists may file for bankruptcy,
it is necessary to understand how recording artists are paid. Typically,
when an artist begins a relationship with a major record label, both parties
agree to a lengthy contract that can govern their relationship for several
years.10 2  This agreement could possibly encompass the artist's entire
career.10 3 Moreover, record labels typically organize the term of recording
contracts by options exercisable at the company's sole discretion.'" 4 These
options allow the label to unilaterally terminate the deal as they deem
necessary, but do not afford the same right to artists. 105
The artist is bound to the payment terms of the contract for all albums
released under the agreement.' 6 Typically, artists receive an advance
when they begin working on a new album. It is usually a percentage of
what the record label believes the artist will earn from record sales, or an
amount sufficient to maintain a respectable lifestyle. 0 7  Once the artist
records and releases an album, the recording artist receives a percentage of
the record's sales. 08 An average artist can expect to receive between
eleven and sixteen percent of the suggested retail price of CDs, while a
superstar may be able to demand a royalty of up to twenty percent."°9
This compensation structure is deceptively complicated. First, record
companies deduct a substantial portion of the artist's royalty income to
reimburse the company for numerous costs such as recording expenses,
packaging costs, promotional copies of records for radio stations and retail
stores, records given to distributors as an incentive to purchase, portions of
marketing and radio promotion, and anticipated returned copies."0 Thus,
the label must sell enough copies of the artist's album to repay itself for all
of these deductions before the artist is entitled to any further royalty
payments. "'1
102. See Lawrence J. Blake, Analysis of a Record Contract, in THE MUSIcIAN's BUsINEss
AND LEGAL GUIDE 326 (Mark Halloran, ed., 1996).
103. Seeid at330-31.
104. Id. at 330.
105. Id.
106. See generally DAVID BASKERVILLE, THE Music BUSINESS HANDBOOK & CAREER
GuiDE 278-80 (5th ed. 1990).
107. Id. at279.
108. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 89.
109. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 109.
110. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 88-99. It is also important to note that these
deductions are all determined by the terms of the contract. Id.
111. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 102.
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Second, all of an artist's albums under a single recording agreement
are usually cross-collateralized. 112 This means that the proceeds from a
successful album must be used to recoup any losses the record label
experienced on the artist's earlier albums.' 13 However, the artist does not
completely bear the ultimate risk of loss. For example, if the artist fails to
sell enough records to repay the label for the previously mentioned
deductions , the record label absorbs the loss, not the artist.
114
When record companies issue advances, they often provide the artist
with funds for sustenance"' and recording Costs.16 For a new artist, this
sum may range between $125,000 and $200,000 per album. 1 7 The artist
must use this money to produce the album subject to the record company's
budgetary approval."' Because albums are quite expensive to produce," 9
the new artist may use a substantial portion of the fund to create the work,
retaining little or no money for personal use.120 Although the recording
fund is typically the largest bulk sum an emerging artist will receive,'12 the
recording artist may have other sources of income. 122 These sources may
include publishing royalties and advances, proceeds from live
performances, merchandising profits and the use of their songs in audio
visual works.
12
1. How Artists May Face Financial Woes
Artists who receive enormous up-front payments often do not worry
about their finances or plan for when they will no longer receive such
advances. 24 This lack of business savvy and foresight can lead an artist
into serious financial problems. 25 For example, MC Hammer lived beyond
his means by traveling with an entourage in excess of one hundred people,
112. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 103.
113. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 103-04.
114. See PASSmAN, supra note 12, at 104.
115. See BASKERVILLE, supra note 106, at 279.
116. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 102, 111-12.
117. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 111.
118. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 112.
119. Recording a decent quality album can easily cost $150,000 or more. Id.
120. Id.
121. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 88-115.
122. See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 221-27, 239-51, 260-63, 333-41, 347-576, 364-74,
375-88.
123. See id.
124. See Pendleton, supra note 89, at YI.
125. Id.
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and purchasing a seven million dollar home. 126  Toni Braxton, also
believing she could afford an extravagant lifestyle, is currently in over two
million dollars debt. 1
27
Personal overspending is only one of the problems that an artist faces.
Due to the large advances recording artists receive, they are often placed in
the highest income tax bracket, losing almost 40 percent of their income to
taxes. 128 Artists often do not realize the financial impact that these taxes
will have on their disposable income.129 Furthermore, artists usually owe a
significant portion of their income to lawyers, managers, producers, and
booking agents. 30 For example, Toni Braxton's producers were paid
approximately one-third of her royalties for their work.1
3'
Record labels often make a larger percentage of album sales than the
recording artist. For example, Toni Braxton was a multi-platinum 32 artist
whose record label is estimated to have received net profits between sixty
and seventy million dollars from her record sales. 13  However, Braxton
only received approximately five million dollars, or less than three percent
of the gross.' 4 The gravity of these financial realities may often surprise
the new star who has suddenly entered into a life of fame and fortune.
Therefore, bankruptcy may be the only recourse for artists who have lived
beyond their means.
To understand why record labels appear to make much more than the
artist, it is important to note what risks record companies face. Statistics
show that only twenty percent of all artists on a label will generate enough
sales to recoup the money that the record label has spent on them. 13  Of
this twenty percent, only the top five percent of the artists will be
profitable. 36 The other eighty percent of artists will lose money for the
record label. 137 Thus, to stay in business with such a high level of risk,
record companies have structured their deals to yield the maximum return
126. Id.
127. Id.; Pener, supra note 1, at 74.
128. Nathan, supra note 91, at 40.
129. See Pendleton, supra note 89, at Yl.
130. See generally Pener, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing an interview with Toni Braxton
about her reasons for filing for bankruptcy).
131. See Pener, supra note 1, at 76.
132. A platinum record must sell over one million copies in the United States. See
PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 108.
133. See Pener, supra note 1, at 75 (quoting estimates by Braxton's managers).
134. See Pener, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting estimates by Braxton's managers).
135. DON CusIc, MUSIC IN THE MARKET 42 (1996).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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from the few artists who become successful.'38 Furthermore, the five
percent of artists who actually do generate profits end up subsidizing the
artists whose albums were a loss, as well the record company's business
costs. As record labels cannot predict which new artists will become
successful, they structure all of their deals to earn large profits in the event
that the artist will succeed against the odds.
IV. PRIOR TREATMENT BY COURTS OF RECORDING ARTISTS FILING FOR
BANKRUPTCY
In considering whether there is a necessity for new laws pertaining to
recording artists, it is imperative to consider the current state of the law.
Currently, a recording artist who files for bankruptcy must meet two
requirements in order to have his or her recording contract rejected: (1) the
court must allow for the rejection of personal service contracts, and (2) the
court must find that the artist did not act in bad faith.
139
A. Personal Service Contracts Are Generally Treated as Rejectable
Generally, courts are liberal in permitting rejection of executory
contracts, which often include personal service contracts, such as recording
agreements. 14° However, existing case law does not clearly dictate whether
it is appropriate to reject personal service contracts.1 41 The confusion is
largely attributed to In re Carrere,142 a Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Court
opinion.
In Carrere, actress Tia Carrere sought to reject a personal services
contract to perform on the soap opera General Hospital in order to accept a
more lucrative contract to perform on another television show, The A-
Team.' 43 In making her motion to reject the General Hospital contract, Ms.
Carrere stated that her primary motivation for filing bankruptcy was to
reject her current obligations in order to be more prosperous. 44 The court
denied her motion on both equitable and legal grounds. 145 The court based
its equitable conclusion on the notion that it would be unfair to protect a
138. See id at49.
139. See Wald, supra note 25, at 3-4.
140. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 385-87. Generally, if some performance is still
due, a contract will be deemed executory. See supra Part II.B.
141. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 385-87.
142. 64 B.R. 156 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
143. Id at 157.
144. See id
145. Id at 160.
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debtor when the major motivation for the rejection is to avoid any
substantive remedy for the breach.14 The bankruptcy system requires good
faith, and Carrere demonstrated bad faith by attempting to use bankruptcy
in lieu of seeking rescission. 147 Thus, the court denied her motion to reject
for lack of "cause."' ' The equitable ground of the decision has not been
criticized. 149
However, the Carrere court also based its conclusion on legal
grounds which have proven confusing to subsequent courts.' 50 The court
interpreted 11 U.S.C. section 365(c)(1)(a) to forbid the rejection of
personal service contracts by the trustee.' 51 This section states that the
trustee in a bankruptcy case may not assume or assign to another party an
executory contract if state law excuses the non-debtor from accepting
performance. 152 A common law rule is that personal service contracts are
not assignable under state law because of the inherently unique quality of
performance sought and therefore excuses the non-debtor from accepting
performance. 153  Moreover, courts have historically refused to compel
performance of a breached personal service contract under bankruptcy
law.' 4 Thus, under a combined reading of common law and section 365,
bankruptcy courts have not been able to assume, assign or compel
performance of personal service contracts.' 55
However, the court went far beyond this common understanding of
section 365. The court interpreted sub-section 365(c)(1)(a) as a complete
restriction on the trustee's ability to assume, assign, or reject personal
service contracts. 5 6 This additional restriction that denies the debtor the
ability to reject a personal service contract did not exist either in the Code
or case law interpreting it.
The court extended this questionable logic further when it concluded
that because debtors are given the identical rights of a trustee in
146. See id
147. See id
148. Carrere, 64 B.R. at 160.
149. See infra Part IV.B.
150. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 386-87.
151. Carrere, 64 B.R. at 159. The court indicated that personal service contracts would not
be rejectable under both Chapters 7 and 11 of the Code. Id. at 158.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 365(cXlXa) (1998).
153. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 365.06[1][b], at 365-56. Common
law restricts the assignment of personal service contracts due to the performing party's special
relationship to the subject of the contract. Id.
154. 4 JOHN POMEROY, A TREATISE IN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1343, at 943-44 (5th ed.
1941).
155. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 365.06[1][b], at 365-56.
156. See Carrere, 64 B.R. at 159.
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bankruptcy, 57 Carrere herself could not reject the contract.'58  Therefore,
no one could reject the contract, and Carrere would be liable for breach.
59
This decision has been criticized as an inappropriate interpretation of
section 365.' 60 Nevertheless, Carrere has not yet been overruled, and is
still good law in the central district of California.1
61
The most often cited and thorough reply to Carrere is In re Taylor. 1
62
In Taylor, the lead singer of "Kool and the Gang," James Taylor, filed for
bankruptcy and sought to reject his various entertainment contracts.
63
Taylor reported assets totaling approximately seven hundred thousand
dollars and liabilities in excess of four million dollars.164 Unlike Carrere,
the court concluded that Taylor had not filed bankruptcy in bad faith.1
65
The court then re-examined Carrere's conclusion that personal
service contracts are not rejectable and read Carrere to stand only for the
proposition that a rejection may be dismissed if filed in bad faith.' 66 The
Taylor court then concluded that section 365 did allow the rejection of
personal service contracts."
The Taylor court based its conclusion on a thorough reading of
section 365. The court explained that, as a general rule, sub-section 365(a)
provides that trustees may assume, assign or reject any executory
contract. 68 The Taylor court then noted that sub-section 365(c)(1)(a)
restricts only the trustee's ability to assume or assign a personal service
contract.' 69 Thus, section 365 does not restrict the trustee's ability to reject
personal service contracts. 70 The court explained, "This is not in the least
157. 11 U.S.C. § 323.
158. See Carrere, 64 B.R. at 159.
159. See id at 160.
160. See Delightful Music, Ltd. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir.
1990). Several other cases have followed Taylor's holding and have implicitly rejected Carrere.
See Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Brown, 211
B.R. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1997); All Blacks B.V.v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970, at 974-75 (W.D. Wash.
1996); In re Sammons, 210 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997) (citations omitted); In re Watkins,
210 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (implicit in courts reasoning); In re Cirillo, 121 B.R. 5, at 7
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
161. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 386-87. But see Cohen and Neale, supra note 4,
at 386 (citing In re Asian, 15 B.C.D. 136, 137 n.l (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)).
162. 913 F.2d 102.
163. Id. at 105-06. These contracts included his recording and publishing contracts. Id
164. Id. at 105.
165. Id. at 108.
166. Id. at 107.
167. Id at 106.
168. Taylor, 913 F.2d at 106; see aLso 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1998).
169. Taylor, 913 F.2d at 106.
170. Id
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surprising since.., any contract which is not assumed... is automatically
rejected [in a Chapter 7 case].' 71
The Taylor court concluded that the trustee's authority to reject
extends to all executory contracts.'7 Subsequent decisions by other courts
have overwhelmingly followed the Taylor rationale and held personal
service contracts rejectable.173
B. Dismissals for Bad Faith
Recording labels arguing against rejection have consistently claimed
that recording artists file for bankruptcy in bad faith, solely to escape their
record contracts. 7 4 If the label succeeds on this contention, the artist will
not be allowed to reject the contract and the case can be dismissed.
75
The Code allows a court to dismiss a voluntary petition if the debtor
fails to meet a good faith requirement, a prerequisite to bankruptcy.' 76 The
Code explicitly requires evidence of good faith for approval of
reorganization plans under Chapters 11 and 13.177 There is no explicit
requirement of good faith in Chapter 7 cases. However, courts have the
inherent power to reject cases filed in bad faith under section 707(a). 78 In
other words, section 707(a) implicitly requires debtors who seek equitable
remedies in bankruptcy, such as rejection, to have "clean hands."'179
To establish bad faith, record labels must meet a high burden of proof.
They are required to show by clear and convincing evidence that a debtor
171. Id.
172. Id. at 107; see All Blacks, 199 B.R. 970, 974-75; Brown, 211 BR. 188; Samnnons, 210
B.R. 197; Watkins, 210 B.R. 394.
173. See All Blacks, 199 B.R. 970, 974-75; Brown, 211 B.R. 188; Sammons, 210 B.R. 197;
Watkins, 210 B.R. 394; Wald, supra note 25, at 3.
174. See Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 106; All Blacks, 199 B.R. 970, 975-76; Watkins, 210 BR.
394, 398-403; In re Bofill, 25 BR. 550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting Arista Record's
argument that it was improper to allow rejection of an executory contract where the sole purpose
of filing for bankruptcy was to have the contract rejected).
175. See Sanmnons, 210 B.R. 197, 200; In re Carrere 64 BR. 156, 160 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
176. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 301.17[3], at 301-41.
177. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(aX3), 1325(aX3)(1996).
178. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTCY, supra note 29, 1 301.17[3], at 301-41 (explaining
that although 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) contains no mention of good faith, the list of grounds for
dismissal contained in § 707(a) is merely an illustrative list which allows consideration of good or
bad faith). A similar provision for Chapter 11 cases appears in 11 U.S.C. § Il12(b). See 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b). The analogous Chapter 13 provision is 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). Legislative
history indicates that Congress approved such a reading, allowing courts to use their equitable
powers to reach the correct result. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 406 (1977).
179. See id. The clean hands doctrine states that a party cannot seek equitable relief if that
party has violated an equitable principle such as good faith. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (6th
ed. 1990).
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filed for bankruptcy solely to accomplish an unlawful purpose, such as
breaching a contract."O Thus, most entertainment related cases involving
bad faith are based on arguments that the debtor filed bankruptcy solely to
reject a recording contract. 8' Currently, case law is split as to whether
filing bankruptcy solely to avoid a personal service contract amounts to bad
faith.1
8 2
1. Cases Finding Bad Faith When Entertainers File Bankruptcy Solely To
Reject Contracts
Carrere is the leading authority in support of dismissing an
entertainer/debtor's motion to reject an executory contract when rejection is
found to be the major motivation in filing bankruptcy.8 3 There, the court
found that Carrere's "' primary motivation for filing bankruptcy was to
reject her General Hospital contract so she could enter a more profitable
contract to play a role in the TV show, The A-Team. 85 The Carrere court
also implied that Carrere's listed debts seemed questionable and indicated
abuse of the system. 186 Because of these two facts, the court found that the
bankruptcy was filed in bad faith. 8 7 As a result, the court denied Carrere's
rejection. 188
Similarly, the court in In re Sammons 89  held that an
entertainer/debtor may not file for bankruptcy primarily to reject an
unfavorable contract solely to accept a more lucrative one' 9° Sammons
involved a heavyweight boxer who sought to reject his current management
agreement in order to enter into a different contract with his new training
manager.' 9' Sammons filed for bankruptcy to reject his original contract
because he did not want to endure the lengthy legal battle involved in
seeking rescission.' 92 The court noted that Sammons's only reported debt
consisted of the damages that would result from the rejection of the
180. See In re Mill Place Ltd. Partnership, 94 B.R. 139, 141-42 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
181. See Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 385-87.
182. See id
183. Carrere, 64 B.R. at 160.
184. Id. at 157. It is important to note that Carrere was an actress, not a recording artist. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 160 n.6.
188. Id. at 160.
189. 210 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 198.
192. Id. at 199.
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contract in dispute.1 93  Based on these findings, the court held that
Sammons demonstrated bad faith and dismissed his bankruptcy case.'
94
Consequently, Sammons and Carrere suggest that, in some jurisdictions, an
entertainer/debtor cannot abuse the bankruptcy system solely to reject an
unfavorable contract in favor of a more beneficial one.1
95
2. Cases Involving Recording Artists That Did Not Result in Bad Faith
Dismissals
As opposed to entertainers paid on a salary or lump sum basis, it is
not as simple to show bad faith in cases involving recording artists. 196
Unlike Carrere and Sammons, another line of cases suggests that it is
improper to dismiss a bankruptcy case when a debtor merely has a strong
motivation to reject an executory contract.' 97  Thus, merely taking
advantage of one's legal rights is not enough, on its own, to establish bad
faith.198
In re Watkinst99 is the best example of this line of reasoning. That
case involved the three members of the musical group known as "TLC.'200
Apparently, the groups' attorney stated to their recording label's
representative that each of the group members was considering filing for
bankruptcy during renegotiations of their recording contracts. 201 After the
negotiations reached an impasse, the members filed for bankruptcy and
sought rejection of their existing contracts.20 2 The court noted that other
courts had denied rejection of contracts simply because another more
profitable contract was available. 2 3 However, there was no direct evidence
that the debtors intended to abuse the bankruptcy process for this
purpose.
To determine whether the debtors filed for bankruptcy in bad faith,
the court examined the following factors: (1) whether the debtors had
193. Id If a contract is rejected, it is treated as a breach and the damages become part of the
estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1998); In re IML Freight, Inc., 37 B.R. 556 (1984).
194. Sanmnons, 210 B.R. at 199-200.
195. Wald, supra note 25, at 6 (citing Carrere, 64 B.R. 156).
196. See infra Part IV.C.
197. See Bofill, 25 B.R. at 552; Cohen & Neale, supra note 4, at 387.
198. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRLYPTcY, supra note 29, 1 707.03[2], at 707-10 to 707-11.
199. 210 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 402.
202. Id. at 398.
203. Id. at 397.
204. Id. at 403.
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suggested that their sole purpose for filing bankruptcy was to reject their
contract; (2) whether the debtors had adjusted their lifestyles; (3) whether
the debtors' conduct changed after filing bankruptcy; (4) whether the
debtors were solvent; (5) whether the debtors had deceptively reported their
liabilities to the bankruptcy court; and (6) whether the debtors were
actually in financial distress.205
First, the Watkins court found no evidence that the debtors' stated an
intent to abuse the bankruptcy system. 206  Even though the debtors'
attorney had stated his clients' intent to file for bankruptcy during
negotiations (presumably to gain leverage), the court found these
statements were insufficient to amount to bad faith.2 °7 The court based this
finding on the debtors' demeanor during the trial, which was not evident
from the opinion.20 8 While the court did not fully explain its reasoning, the
court's conclusion suggests that the artists were truly in financial
distress.2° It appears that TLC's members would have legitimately needed
bankruptcy relief if renegotiations did not result in more income.210
Second, the court determined that the debtors' expenditures and lack
of lifestyle adjustment were not an issue because all of the debtors' funds
used to perpetuate their post-petition lifestyle were not subject to the
bankruptcy proceeding. 211 The funds were not available to the creditors
because they were either exempt or were earned after the filing and outside
the scope of the bankruptcy proceedings.212
Third, the court determined that there was no evidence of post-
petition conduct indicating bad faith.213  This was also based on the
debtors' post-petition use of only exempt funds.21 4
Fourth, the court examined the solvency of the debtors. While
bankruptcy does not require that a debtor actually be insolvent to
voluntarily file for bankruptcy, 215 solvency may indicate bad faith. Even
205. In re Watkins, 210 B.R. at 398. The Watkins court cited several cases that used such
factors. See, e.g., In re Dixie Broad., Inc. 871 F.2d 1023 (lth Cir. 1989); In re Phoenix
Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1988); see also In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.
1991); AllBlacks, 199 B.R. at 975-76; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 707.03[2],
at 707-10 to 707-11.
206. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 403.
207. Id. at 402.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 399.
210. Id. at 402.
211. See id
212. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 402.
213. Id. at 403.
214. See id.
215. See id at 399; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 1109.02, at 109-7. But see
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though the debtors became solvent after filing, each of the debtors was
unable to pay her debts at the time she filed for bankruptcy. 1 6 The debtors
established that they were behind on car payments, insurance premiums,
credit card bills, and even medical bills.21 7 In some cases, the debtors were
more than three months delinquent.21 '  The court concluded that the
relevant and dispositive fact was that the debtors had a good basis for
believing they were insolvent when they filed for bankruptcy.
219
Fifth, the court examined whether the members of TLC had disguised
their financial condition. 220  Full and fair disclosure in a bankruptcy
proceeding requires the scheduling of many assets.221 The recording label
argued that the group had some contracts and properties not listed in their
bankruptcy schedules. 222 The court examined each of these items in detail.
The Watkins court excused some of those items as acquired post-petition
and therefore exempt from the proceedings.22 The debtors had also fairly
assumed that the other properties, such as an option contract with MTV that
was never exercised, had no value.224  Thus, the omissions were not
material, and were not intended to disguise their financial condition.225
Even if the assets had significant worth, the court noted that the bankruptcy
code contains other remedies for intentional omissions and that dismissal
was inappropriate in such cases.226
Perhaps, the most significant part of the court's analysis is the
discussion of the recording label's recoupable expenses for TLC.227 TLC's
royalties had not generated enough funds to recoup the expenses the record
label incurred on TLC's behalf.228  In fact, just before TLC filed for
bankruptcy, the record label's latest statement indicated that TLC would
need to generate $576,000 in royalties before any of the group's members
could receive royalty payments. 229 The record label insisted that this was
11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1998) (providing a few non-relevant exceptions for distinguishable cases).
216. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 399.
217. See id at 398.
218. See id
219. See id at 399.
220. See id at 400.
221. See id
222. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 400.
223. See id at 401.
224. See id
225. Seeid at401.
226. See I at 400.
227. See id at 401. For an explanation of the recording label's recoupable expenses see Part
III.A.
228. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 401.
229. See id
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not a true debt because the artists would not be accountable for the
expenses outside of the recoupment through record royalties. 230 Thus, this
was not a traditional debt.2'
The court rejected this argument relying on Johnson v. Home State
Bank. 232 There, the Supreme Court found that a negative royalty balance
was a claim against future property in the form of royalties. 3 Thus, the
$576,000 could properly be listed as a liability and viewed as part of TLC's
total debt.234 This large debt greatly influenced the court in determining the
solvency' of the debtors.23'
The sixth and final factor was whether the debtors were truly
financially distressed. The recording company argued that the majority of
debt came from the negative royalty balances in their control.236 Because
the label had not pressured the TLC members for payment, the group was
not distressed.237
The court rejected this argument because the debt was payable only
from TLC's royalties that the record company could not contractually
request.23' Moreover, the debtors had been pressured by unrelated parties
to deliver payments for debt that their cash flow could not cover.239
Because the creditors "affected each [dlebtor's daily life," the debtors were
experiencing bona fide distress that warranted bankruptcy relief 240
Although In re Watkins is the most thorough opinion involving record
contracts and bad faith bankruptcy claims, there are other cases in this area
230. See id
231. Id.
232. 501 U.S. 78, 85 (1991).
233. See Johnson, 501 U.S. 78. Johnson held that a claim against property of the debtor
included all interests, including interests against property regardless of how they came about. Id.
at 85. Because future royalties are property rights that can be bought and sold, the Watkins court
concluded that they fit within the Court's interpretation of the Code's definition of a claim. See
Watkins, 210 B.R. at 401.
234. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 401. It is notable that, as a group, TLC was jointly and
severally liable for the negative royalty balance. Therefore, each of the members could report the
total $576,000 on their individual indebtedness. See id
235. See id. at 399.
236. Id. at398.
237. Id.
238. Id The contract stated TLC's negative royalty balance could only be paid by record
royalties and not by the artists' other income. Id. It is also important to note that any contract
term modifying or terminating the contract in the event of bankruptcy is invalid. See 11 U.S.C. §
541(c) (1998); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348 (1977).
239. See Watkins, 210 B.R. at 398. Parties seeking payment included banks threatening
foreclosure on property, credit card companies, and other non-entertainment related parties who
had acquired judgments for damages in civil suits. Id.
240. Id. at 399.
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that warrant discussion. In All Blacks B. V v. Gruntruck,241 a "grunge
band" sought bankruptcy relief after it failed to receive further funding
from its recording company. 242 The band members filed bankruptcy on the
advice of their attorney while the attorney was seeking another record
contract for the band.243 The record company challenged the bankruptcy
case as being filed in bad faith. 244
However, the bankruptcy court rejected the bad faith argument.2 45
The record label appealed the decision to the jurisdiction's federal district
court.246 The district court found no evidence that the debtors' intent or
sole purpose in petitioning for bankruptcy was to avoid their contracts with
the record label.247 Despite the fact that one of the band members had
received an inheritance with a $50,000 future value that would not accrue
until 2001, the All Blacks court rejected the record company's claim that
the band was not experiencing genuine financial crisis."" The court
concluded that the income was not substantial enough to remedy the band's
debt since they had a negative royalty balance of $130,000.249
The All Blacks court also concluded that the band's negative royalty
balance of $130,000 was properly included in the statement of the band's
indebtedness.25° Unlike the Watkins court, which based its conclusion on
Supreme Court case law,25' the All Blacks court relied on a simple reading
of the governing statute, section 101(5).252 Under this section, a debt is a
liability on a claim, 253 and a claim includes a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is ...contingent ....,54 The band's negative royalty
balance was only payable from uncertain future royalties.2 5  Thus, the
band's future income from their recording contract was contingent and
threatened the band's ability to move forward financially.256 Therefore, the
court held that it was proper to include the negative royalty balance in the
241. 199 B.R. 970 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
242. Id. at 971-72.
243. Id. at 972.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 975.
246. Id.
247. All Blacks, 199 B.R. at 975.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Johnson, 501 U.S. 78.
252. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(1988).
253. Id. § 101(12).
254. Id. § 101(5).
255. All Blacks, 199 B.R. at 975-976.
256. Id.
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total indebtedness.257 Finally, the court found that the band did not seek to
abuse the bankruptcy system and that it was improper to dismiss the
bankruptcy petition.58 In sum, it appears that courts are more likely to find
good faith in cases dealing with recording artists if the indebtedness is
created by a negative royalty balance.
C. Reconciling These Two Lines of Cases
Watkins and similar cases are usually cited to oppose cases such as
Carrere259 and Sammons.260 However, these two lines of cases are actually
consistent with each other. First, both the Carrere and Sammons courts
found that the debtors intended to abuse the bankruptcy process by filing
for the sole purpose of rejecting their contracts. 6' In both Watkins and
Gruntruck, the courts found the record devoid of any such intent.262 These
courts then looked for evidence indicating that the debtors intended to
manipulate the bankruptcy system for an improper purpose.263
These cases suggest that courts look first for direct evidence or
testimony of intent to abuse the bankruptcy process. If no such evidence
exists, the courts then search for other factors, such as the absence of
financial distress, to determine if the debtors were manipulating the
system.
264
These cases are consistent when viewed in their proper contexts. In
Watkins, Gruntruck and the other similar cases, the debtors were all
recording artists. 265  These cases all assumed that the artists' negative
royalty balances were debts properly included in the bankruptcy as a claim
266on future property.
257. Id
258. Id. Other courts have subscribed to this analysis either explicitly or implicitly. See
Delightful Music, Ltd. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Bofill, 25 B.R.
550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Noonan 17 B.R. 793, 798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
259. In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
260. In re Sammons, 210 BR. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
261. See supra Part IV.B.1.
262. Id.
263. See supra Part IV.B.2.
264. Id.
265. See Delightful Music, Ltd. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1990)
(involving singer songwriter Willie Nile); All Blacks BY. v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970, 975-76
(W.D. Wash. 1996); In re Watkins, 210 B.R. 394, 398-403 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); In re Bofill,
25 B.R. 550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting Arista Record's argument that it was
improper to allow rejection of an executory contract where the sole purpose of filing for
bankruptcy was to have the contract rejected).
266. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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Record labels often incur substantial costs in developing artists, which
are added to the artist's negative royalty balance.267 Therefore, the negative
royalty balances tend to greatly exceed the assets of an artist/debtor who
has yet to receive any income from his or her labors.2 6' Because the
negative royalty balance is considered a debt in bankruptcy, 269 the large
amount of negative royalty balances can demonstrate that the artist is
overburdened by debt.
Both Carrere and Sammons, while involving entertainment related
contracts, did not involve recording artists or deals that were structured like
record contracts.270 The contracts at issue were generally structured like
most personal service contracts and involved salaries or lump sum
payments.27' Contracts based on salary generally do not involve a negative
royalty or recoupable sum of money.272 Also, the debtors in these two
cases arguably had no substantial debt except for the damages resulting
from a breach of the contracts at issue. 273 However, in cases involving
recording artists, the record company's claim to future royalties remains
even if the contract is not rejected.2 74  Therefore, while salary based
contract that are not rejected eliminate any future debt, recording contracts,
if not rejected, would still allow for other debt in the form of negative
royalty balances.
Both legal and factual considerations suggest that when the cases are
read together and reconciled, recording companies have a higher burden
when trying to establish that the debtor filed in bad faith. Absent the
unlikely case where an artist has openly admitted an intent to abuse the
bankruptcy system, a record company will not be able to establish bad
faith.27 ' It appears that there must be extreme evidence (like the Watkins
court was looking for) or the artist must have recouped all of their negative
royalties.
While record labels may not be able to establish bad faith when an
artist wishes to reject theirrecording contract, record labels still maintain
the majority of control over their relationship with the artist. This control
267. See supra Part III.
268. See Taylor, 913 F.2d at 106; AllBlacks, 199 B.R. at 975-76; Watkins, 210 B.R. at 398-
403.
269. See Johnson, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
270. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
271. See Saumnons, 210 B.R. at 199; In re Carrere, 64 B.R. at 156, 157 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
272. See, e.g., Carrere, 64 B.R. at 156.
273. See Sanmons, 210 B.R. at 199; Carrere, 64 B.R. at 157.
274. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1998).
275. Moreover, exhaustive research revealed no cases where a recording artist was found to
have filed in bad faith.
19991 RECORD LABELS BENEFIT FROM BANKRUPTCY CODE CHANGES 469
is largely created from the unproven artist's lack of leverage in initial
recording contract negotiations. 276 Bankruptcy provides the artist with a
limited apparatus to redress the imbalance in negotiation strength.277
However, if the proposed legislation passes, recording artists will have
virtually no remedy for one-sided contracts dictated by recording labels.
V. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The History ofa Sordid Provision
On June 10, 1998, the House of Representatives passed278 the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 ("the Act").279  This bill was the
culmination of efforts to curb the rise in bankruptcy cases and the overall
abuse of the system, especially in Chapter 7 cases that allow complete
discharges. 20 According to congressional records, the Act was a direct
response to a twenty-five percent increase in filings in 1997 despite a
strong economy and low unemployment .2  Congress determined that
debtors who were able to settle their debts were increasingly abusing
bankruptcy and the complete discharge process.28 2
During the creation of the bill, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA"), an organization representing record companies,
successfully lobbied for a provision to be inserted into the Act to make it
more difficult for artists to escape their recording contract by altering
section 365.283 The proposed amendment was originally drafted as follows:
(5) Where the court finds that a personal services contract is
property of the estate, the trustee may not reject an executory
contract for personal services in which advances are paid for the
creation of copyrighted sound recordings in the future if a
material purpose for commencing a case under this title is to
reject such contract, unless, absent such rejection, economic
276. See Pener, supra note 1, at 74-75.
277. See Collins, supra note 11, at 7.
278. 144 CONG. REC. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1988) (Roll No. 225).
279. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
280. See Kozlowski, supra note 20.
281. Id.
282. id.
283. Katherine Q. Seelye, Bankruptcies by Musicians Inspire a Bill, N.Y. Tnvffis, May 15,
1998, at A3.
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rehabilitation of the debtor's finances, including such contract,
cannot be achieved.2u
This relatively small provision received much attention. It was
sharply criticized by Democrats, 85 the American Federation of Musicians
("AF of M"), the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
("AFTRA"), 2 6 and the International Managers Forum ("IMF").
287
The groups primarily protested on two grounds. The first argument
was that recording contracts were singled out in relation to all other
executory contracts.288 The second argument was that the provision was
duplicative of decisions like Carrere and Watkins.28 9  By formally
codifying such a specially targeted provision, recording artists were likely
to be subjected to an indirect and unwarranted higher standard of
scrutiny.29 Such a higher standard of scrutiny in cases involving recording
artists would give the recording companies even more economic control
over an artist than their contracts can legally establish.29'
Politicians blasted the bill as "smell[ing] like a very, very special-
interest" provision. 2  According to a spokesperson for Congressman
Gekas, sponsor of the House of Representatives bill, this provision quickly
became one of the five most controversial issues in the bill.293  After
issuing many passionate statements, the RIAA agreed to negotiate
compromise language with the unions and politicians.2 4
Meanwhile, the Senate passed its own less conservative,295 more pro-
debtor bill,296 the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997.297 The
Senate bill did not contain any provision regarding recording artists .298
After the Senate bill passed, a conference committee was created by the
284. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 212 (1998)
(modifying 11 U.S.C § 365(n)).
285. Seelye, supra note 283.
286. See Bill Holland, Bankruptcy Bill Raises Concern, BILLBOARD, May 23, 1998, at 8.
287. See Bergman, supra note 19.
288. See Holland, supra note 286.
289. Id.; Bergman, supra note 19.
290. See Holland, supra note 286.
291. Id. A contractual term that exempts an agreement from bankruptcy is void as a matter
of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348 (1977).
292. See Holland, supra note 286 (quoting Rep. Waters).
293. Telephone interview with Dina Ellis, supra note 21. She stated that a lot of support
came from the Senate democrats who had strong ties to recording artists and their interests. Id.
294. See Holland, supra note 286.
295. See Kozlowski, supra note 21.
296. See id.
297. The Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998).
298. See id; Seelye, supra note 286.
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houses to combine the two bills.299 The compromise bill was passed by the
House of Representatives on October 9, 1998. 30
Shortly before the compromise bill was completed, the RIAA, the
unions, and a few members of Congress reached a final agreement on the
provision relating to recording artists and their ability to reject their
recording contracts.301 According to Carry Sherman, General Counsel for
the RIAA, the revised provision would not be contested because it reflected
a middle ground approved by both the recording industry and recording
artists .302
However, the bankruptcy bill negotiations did not result in such an
equal compromise. Even though the final product of the committee was
passed in the House of Representatives,3 3 the Senate let the bill expire by
failing to vote on it before the end of the term.3° It has been speculated
that this filibuster was prompted by the White House, through the Office of
Management and Budget, which promised to veto the compromise.3 5
According to an unnamed White House representative, the compromised
bill did not provide enough protection for low income debtors and more
resembled the House of Representatives' strongly Republican bill.3°
Nevertheless, the conference committee bill containing the new
provision which would allow courts more leeway in rejecting recording
contracts may reappear in legislation proposed in the future. In fact,
several politicians have indicated that the bill will be reintroduced in the
106th Congress.30 7  Moreover, it is likely that the RIAA and union
compromise provision will be included when the Bankruptcy Reform Act
is reintroduced.30 8
299. See Kozlowski, supra note 20; Electronic Mail from American Bankruptcy Institute
(Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
300. See 144 CONG. REC. H10239 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (Roll No. 506).
301. RIAA press release (Oct. 6, 1998) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal).
302. Telephone Interview with Carry Sherman, supra note 21.
303. See 144 CONG. REC. H10239 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (Roll No. 506).
304. Electronic Mail from American Bankruptcy Institute (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with the
Loyola ofLos Angeles Entertamnent Law Journal).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id.; Telephone Interview with Dina Ellis, supra note 21 (indicating Congressman
Gekas's intent to reintroduce the Bankruptcy Reform Act); Telephone Interview with Carry
Sherman, supra note 21 (indicating the RIAA's intent to reintroduce the compromised language).
308. Telephone Interview with Carry Sherman, supra note 21 (indicating the RIAA's intent
to reintroduce the compromised language).
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B. Recording Contracts and the RMA, AFTRA, AF of M, and IMF
Compromise Provision
1. The Addition of the "Needs.Based" Bankruptcy Test
The final compromise of the RIAA, AFTRA, AF of M, and IMF was
inserted into the proposed legislation on October 7, 1998. To understand
how the new provision works, it is important to grasp how the proposed
amendments to the Code would reduce the number of Chapter 7 voluntary
bankruptcies.
Part of the overhaul of the Code was the establishment of a "needs
based" bankruptcy test for Chapter 7 cases. 309 First, the legislature created
a rebuttable presumption of abuse if the debtor is able to pay either twenty-
five percent of unsecured debts-which includes liabilities such as credit
card debts and negative royalty balances-or five thousand dollars over
five years. 10
To help determine whether the debtor can meet this minimum
payment plan, the Act provides several guidelines to establish what
expenses the debtor is allowed, including a monthly budget.31' The
rebuttable presumption of abuse in Chapter 7 cases can be rebutted by
establishing that the debtor's income would fail to cover the twenty-five
percent or five thousand dollars over five years.31 2 The only other way for
a debtor to rebut the "needs based" Chapter 7 test is to establish that
extraordinary circumstances require additional monthly expenses, and that
these expenses would make it impossible for the debtor to pay the twenty-
five percent or five thousand dollars over five years. 13 If the debtor is
unable to rebut the presumption of abuse, his case is involuntarily
converted into a Chapter 13 case.314
Thus, an artist filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy who fails to meet the
new "needs based" test would not be able to take advantage of the Chapter
309. Telephone Interview with Dina Ellis, supra note 21.
310. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C §
707(bX2XAXi) (1998); Kozlowski, supra note 20.
311. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.c §
707(bX2XAXii-iv).
312. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C §
707(b)(2XAXi).
313. See H.R. CON. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C §
707(bX2XB).
314. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifing 11 U.S.C § 707.
Converting a case to Chapter 13 does not allow automatic rejection of debt.. See supra Part II.
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7 automatic rejection.31 5 The debtor will then have to establish that the
recording contract will be disadvantageous or onerous to him or her.316
This creates a higher burden for the recording artist/debtor filing for a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, it is imperative to note that the higher
burden applies to everyone filing for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.1 7
The general provision of the conference report also provides that
where the presumption of abuse has been rebutted or excused, the court can
still consider whether the case has been filed in bad faith.318 The second
portion of the needs based test lowers the standard used to prove bad faith
violations of the bankruptcy process from a "substantial abuse" test to
merely an "abuse test. 3 9 However, this may not be a substantive change
because no real definition of either term exists.
Therefore, even if an artist can satisfy the rebuttable presumption of
bad faith, the court may still dismiss their case or involuntarily convert it to
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy upon a finding of mere "abuse" (such as bad faith
or lack of financial distress), instead of the former "substantial abuse"
standard.
320
2. The Bill's New Standard for Considering the Rejection of Personal
Service Contracts
The compromise reached by the RIAA and the unions raises the bar
even higher than the already substantial standard for debtors filing for
Chapter 7. The revised provision reads that, even where the debtor has
rebutted the presumption of abuse, the court can dismiss the case or convert
it into a Chapter 13 case if the totality of the debtor's financial
circumstances demonstrates abuse.3 21  This is a far lower standard than
required by current case law in bad faith filings.
The provision specifically directs the courts to examine whether the
debtor "seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need
for such rejection as sought by the debtor" when considering the totality of
315. See supra Part II.
316. See supra Part II.B.
317. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modfyfing 11 U.S.C § 707
(containing no mention of recording artists).
318. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 6 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C §
707(bX3XA).
319. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C § 707(bX1).
320. Id.
321. See H.R. CoNF. RFP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 6 (1998) modifying 11 U.S.C §
707(bX3XB).
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the circumstances.322 Generally, this seems to create a lower burden of
proof to either dismiss or convert the case to Chapter 13. It also seems to
direct the court to pay special attention to situations where there is a
rejection of a personal service contract at issue.
3. How the Proposed Law Affects Current Law
While the proposed changes may seriously hamper artists' efforts to
effectively utilize bankruptcy for their needs, there are some comforting
notions about the current state of the changes. First, because the 1998 bill
did not become law and was strongly opposed by the White House,3 23 any
reintroduced bill would likely be altered before it is enacted into law.
Second, the "needs based" bankruptcy test and the proposed test for
personal service contracts only applies to cases filed under Chapter 7324 If
the court decides that a Chapter 7 case involving a recording contract does
not meet these standards, the court may convert the case to a Chapter 13
case. 2 This does not preclude the rejection of a recording contract.
26
However, the court still has discretion to dismiss the case.
3 27
Next, as with any newly created law, the courts will have to struggle
to interpret and determine how to apply the tests set forth by the legislature.
This may allow courts to construe the revised provisions more moderately
than they appear as drafted. As a spokesperson for the RIAA contended,
because the proposed tests apply to all personal service contracts and not
merely record contracts, these tests will generate more case law than a
specific provision singling out recording artists.32a
Because the new standard for personal service contracts allows judges
to look for more than bad faith, which is a heavy burden for record
labels,329 perhaps the courts will be able to examine the facts of a given
case more thoroughly.330 This suggests that a court could look beyond a
recording artist's negative royalty balance to determine if the artist's other
liabilities are enough, on their own, to determine bad faith.
322. See id
323. See supra Part V.A.
324. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifying 11 I.S.C § 707.
325. See id. Converting a case to Chapter 13 does not allow automatic rejection of debt.
See supra Part II.
326. See supra Part 11.
327. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifing 11 U.S.C § 707.
328. Telephone Interview with Carry Sherman, supra note 21.
329. See supra Part IV.C.
330. Telephone Interview with Carry Sherman, supra note 21.
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4. The Compromised Provisions Are Still Overprotective of Record
Companies and Under-Protective of Recording Artists
The major concern for the record companies involved in bankruptcy
disputes with recording artists is that they will lose contracts with artists on
the verge of success, such as Toni Braxton.33" ' With respect to such artists,
the "need based" bankruptcy changes are a sufficient remedy. Because
record royalties often accumulate long before the artist's royalty balance is
adjusted,332 the record label can demonstrate that the artist is expected to
generate at least the five thousand dollar minimum payment over five years
prescribed by the "need based" bankruptcy test.333 This is especially true
considering that the test also provides a standardized monthly budget for
petitioners,334 alleviating the problem of the over-spending artist.335
Because an artist who does not qualify for the "need based" test
would either have his or her case dismissed or be forced into a Chapter 13
bankruptcy, the record companies' worries would be resolved. A Chapter
13 bankruptcy requires that the debtor satisfy the "business judgment"
test.336 Here again, if the record company could show that the artist was
about to benefit from the recording contract, it would not be in the artist's
best interests to reject the contract. Thus, it would be proper for the court
to refuse to grant a motion to reject the contract. While the new contract
may better enable the artist to repay their debts, it would be inequitable to
allow a greedy debtor to escape contractual obligations and leave the record
company without substantial remedies.
However, the proposed provision goes further than this. It adds
special requirements that appear to lower the standard for finding an
unlawful abuse of the bankruptcy system.337 Because the provision
specifically addresses personal service contracts, it appears to require a
stricter standard to review the circumstances when contracts like recording
agreements are at issue. For example, a poor and struggling recording
artist might be able to pass the "need based" test, but would ultimately fail
when the court notes that the artist was seeking to reject a recording
contract that could yield some financial benefit. This seems counter to the
331. See Holland, supra note 286, at 8.
332. See supra Part III.C.
333. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, § 102, at 5 (1998) modifyng 11 U.S.C § 707.
334. See id.
335. See supra Part III.A.1.
336. See supra Part II.B.
337. See supra Part V.B.2.
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Code's promise for a "fresh start" for those in need of relief from financial
distress .338
Watkins demonstrates that when there is alleged manipulation of the
bankruptcy system, courts are willing to carefully examine all of the
circumstances surrounding an artist's Chapter 7 petition.339 A bad faith
analysis test like the test used in Watkins would catch debtors who were
truly free from financial distress. Moreover, if recording artists have no
substantial chance of recouping their negative royalty balances, then the
artists will only continue to accrue more negative royalties on future
albums, if any. Therefore, such artists will not have the opportunity to
make any money from their recordings beyond the advances they originally
received, putting them in debt to the record company.
VI. CONCLUSION
As bankruptcy case law regarding the rejection of record contracts has
developed, record companies should not fear that artists will file
bankruptcy solely to reject their recording contracts. Generally cases
involving explicitly illegitimate purposes and abuses of the bankruptcy
system, like Carrere, have been dismissed by a finding of bad faith.
Bankruptcy law already grants record companies control against successful
artists that feign the need for the help of bankruptcy. Adding more specific
legislation to make the rejection of record contracts almost impossible for
those truly in need is an unnecessarily harsh reaction to extreme cases.
Perhaps the best solution would be for the record companies to attack
the root of the problem rather than the manifestation. It would be
beneficial to all parties involved if record labels initiated financial training
for their artists who do not understand how money flows in the recording
business. Artists could then maximize the money they earn in the event
that they are not the one out of a million superstar. Moreover, record labels
could better ensure that they would not be faced with bankruptcy cases.
Finally, rejection of a recording contract does not necessarily preclude
the enforceability of covenants not to compete or the availability of
equitable remedies such as negative injunctions. 340 However, the case law
in this area is unsettled and unclear?4' While a negative injunction will not
affect a record company's ability to capitalize on further works of the
338. See supra Part I.
339. See supra Part IV.B.2.
340. See ln re Brown, 211 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
341. Wald, supra note 25, at 3.
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debtor, it will allow the record company to prevent other companies from
benefiting at their expense.3 2
David C. Norrell
342. For a more thorough discussion, see Wald, supra note 25, at 3.
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